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This is the first in a series of articles that overarchingly proposes
that the globalization of markets necessitates the integration of the Law
& Economics Framework into legal education across all legal systems.
The goal of this article is to introduce readers to the Law & Economics
Framework by providing an overview of relevant terms, concepts, and
historical background. This article discusses the interplay of lawyers and
globalization; defines the Law & Economic Framework and its origins;
details relevant principles of economics; and delves into some criticisms
of the Framework. The remainder of the series will be devoted to
demonstrating that the intersection of international commerce and
national laws necessitates the implementation of the Law & Economics
Framework in legal education across legal systems.
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INTRODUCTION 1

Undoubtedly, “concerns about the adverse effects of globalization aren’t
new.” 2 Nevertheless, the speed and complexity of “globalization”—and
its far-reaching positive and negative impacts—have continued to
evolve. 3 This raises questions regarding how legal systems and related
legal education around the world can best keep up. One partial solution is
for legal education in all countries to fully implement the Law &
Economics Framework. 4
For present purposes, “globalization” refers to the significant
integration of markets resulting from “an open international economy
with large and growing flows of trade and capital investment between
countries.” 5 However, globalization impacts far more than just trade and
capital flows; it also impacts other national (domestic) interests.
Globalization has “effects on societies and cultures, ecosystems and
health, [and] justice and equality.” 6 Globalization even implicates the
“interplay of foreign legal norms and local legal culture.” 7
1. This article is the first installment of a series of articles produced with the cooperation of
Hanoi Law University, The University of Akron School of Law and (hopefully) additional law
schools. After giving proper attribution to the original publishing journal or law review, each of the
participating law schools will have the right to print all installments of this series in their primary
native language and the joint right to print all installments in English. The University of Akron Law
Review has kindly agreed to act as a repository for all articles within this series. The articles will be
published in Volume 54, Issue 5 of the Akron Law Review. The repository can currently be reached
at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss5/.
2. Paul Krugman, What Economists (Including Me) Got Wrong About Globalization,
B LOOMBERG: OPINION (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/opinion/articles/2019-1010/inequality-globalization-and-the-missteps-of-1990s-economics [https://perma.cc/Y5N4-U4AS].
3. See, e.g., Arvind Subramanian & Martin Kessler, The Hyperglobalization of Trade and its
Future, in TOWARDS A B ETTER GLOBAL ECONOMY: P OLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR C ITIZENS
WORLDWIDE IN THE 21ST C ENTURY 216, 216–78 (2014); see also George L. De Feis, Donald
Grunewald, & George N. De Feis, International Trade Theory of Hyper-Globalization and HyperInformation Flow Conceived, 5 INT’L J. B US. & APPLIED S CI . 23, 23–28 (2016).
4. As used throughout this article, the “Law & Economics Framework” refers to the economic
analysis of law as a form of legal analysis. The article refrains from using the phrase “economi c
analysis of law” to make it clear that the focus of this approach is primarily within the field of legal
scholars relying upon economic theory.
5. Paul Hirst & Grahame Thomson, Globalization: Ten frequently asked questions and some
surprising answers, S OUNDINGS, Autumn 1996, at 47; see also JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION:
A C RITICAL INTRODUCTION –(2d ed. 2005); for an overview of the various competing definitions of
“globalization,” see Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan & Gérard Stoudmann, Program on Geopolitical
Implications of Globalization Transnat’l Security, Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive
Overview and a Proposed Definition, GENEVA C TR. FOR S EC. P OL’Y, June 19, 2006, at 1.
6. Aleya Abdel-Hadi, Culture, Quality of Life, Globalization and Beyond, 50 P ROCEDIA –
S OC. & B EHAV. S CI . 11, 11 (2012).
7. P ITMAN B. P OTTER, THE C HINESE LEGAL S YSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL
CULTURE 2 (2005).
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Fortunately, national governments are not destined to be passive
victims of globalization. Within the increasingly interconnected world,
“[d]urable national institutions and distinctive ideological traditions still
seem to shape and channel crucial corporate decisions.” 8 Even when
international activity is ostensibly between private parties, national
governments still play a major role: “despite claims that globalization is
leading to unified legal standards, much of law remains uniquely local,
embodying local customs, legitimizing local moral judgments, and
enforced, adopted and interpreted by legislators and judges who are
selected directly or indirectly by the residents they will govern.” 9
While national governments are not completely powerless, they do
not completely control the globalization process either. Most international
businesses have little inherently-vested interests linked to any specific
country. Indeed, the corporate decision to do business in one country,
rather than another, often simply involves the international effort to
reduce costs—and/or to secure higher profits through special access to
markets. 10
Consequently, if a particular country appropriately aligns its laws
and legal institutions, then the country will be more attractive to global
businesses and be more likely to reap meaningful benefits. But if a country
fails to intelligently manage its laws and legal institutions, the country will
likely find itself at a competitive disadvantage—either in attracting global
commerce or managing the results of it. Whether through the development
of better institutions or the tailoring of laws and regulations, national
governments have the ability to increase – or decrease—the benefits of
global activities. 11 And, given the central role played by legal rules in the
process, it is clear that lawyers can play a valuable role in shaping and
managing the interaction between national interests and market behavior.
In many countries, lawyers may have been traditionally excluded
from policymaking, or otherwise restricted to narrowly defined roles.
Nonetheless, in today’s globalized world, it is a mistake to exclude
8. Louis W. Pauly & Simon Reich, National structures and multinational corporate behavior:
enduring differences in the age of globalization, 51 INT’L ORG. 1, 1 (1997); see also P AUL HIRST,
GRAHAME THOMPSON, & S IMON B ROMLEY, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION xii–xiii (3d ed. 2009).
9. Carole Silver, Internationalizing U.S. Legal Education: A Report on the Education of
Transnational Lawyers, 14 C ARDOZO J. INT’L & C OMP. L. 143, 143 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. R EV. 112, 112–13 (1971); JOE S TATEN B AIN, B ARRIERS TO NEW
C OMPETITION (1956); S TEPHEN HERBERT HYMER, THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL
F IRMS: A S TUDY OF DIRECT F OREIGN INVESTMENT (1976) (MIT Monographs in Economics).
11. Anna Maria Mayda, Kevin H. O’Rourke, & Richard Sinnott, Risk, Government and
Globalization: International Survey Evidence, 16 (NBER, Working Paper No. 13037, 2007).
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domestic lawyers from globalization management. Long ago,
international corporations recognized the value of integrating global legal
services with business planning. 12 This enabled international corporations
to strategically evaluate all options with a complete understanding of both
the legal and business consequences. In contrast, if an individual country
decides to exclude their domestic lawyers from learning the Law &
Economics Framework, the country is effectively creating an asymmetry
that benefits international businesses. 13
Of course, there are important differences in the expectations and
roles played by lawyers in different societies. The examination of legal
education in a society provides a window on its legal system. Here, one
sees the expression of basic attitudes about the law: what law is, what
lawyers do, and how the system operates or how it should operate. 14
However, globalization increasingly creates a common need to adapt
the form and substance of each particular country’s legal education
system. Legal education provides a critical mechanism for reinforcing the
legal values and existing culture of the particular country. Even so, in
narrowly fulfilling its socialization function, legal education can actually
be an impediment to realizing (or otherwise coping with) the results of
change—including many of the issues presented by globalization.
Fortunately, legal education within individual nations can fulfill both
functions—reinforcing local legal traditions while expressly addressing
the implications of globalization on the domestic practice of law. Even
better, legal education can turn the problem around and educate lawyers
on how the practice of law can help manage market behavior and the
implications of globalization. In fact, legal education within individual
countries is uniquely positioned to do both—and it starts with the Law &
Economics Framework.
DISCUSSION

12. Debora L. Spar, Lawyers Abroad: The Internationalization of Legal Practice, 39 C AL.
MGMT. R EV. 8, 10–14 (1997).
13. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489–491 (1970). As a reminder, the present article does not attempt
to address the broader argument as to whether or not “Law and Economics” constitutes (or should
constitute) an independent legal theory. For further discussions on this issue, see GUIDO C ALABRESI ,
Of Law and Economics and Economic Analysis of Law, in THE F UTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:
ESSAYS ON R EFORM AND R ECOLLECTION (2016); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics
Meets Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 99 (1993).
14. Lawrence M. Friedman, Lawyers in Cross-Cultural Perspective, in LAWYERS IN S OCIETY:
C OMPARATIVE THEORIES 1 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1989).
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WHAT IS THE LAW & E CONOMICS FRAMEWORK?

The Law & Economics Framework “studies how legal institutions,
and changes in those institutions, affect economic behavior.” 15 Stated
slightly differently:
[The Law & Economics Framework] uses economic theory to analyze
the legal world. It examines the world from the standpoint of economic
theory and, as a result of that examination, confirms, casts doubt upon,
and often seeks reform of legal reality. . . In its most aggressive and
reformist mode, having looked at the world from the standpoint of
economic theory, if it finds that the legal world does not fit, it proclaims
[the legal] world to be ‘irrational.’ 16

In the case of globalization, the Law & Economics Framework can
be used to consider how an individual country can modify its legal
institutions to maximize the benefits and/or minimize the detriment of
internationally coordinated activities. Essentially, the Law & Economic
Framework is an “area of economic inquiry to which a substantial
knowledge of law in both its doctrinal and institutional aspects is
relevant.” 17 The Law & Economics Framework is a proactive approach to
legal thought—supported by economic theory.
In its most narrow sense, the Law & Economics Framework includes
bodies of law “regulating explicit markets—such as contract and property
law, labor, antitrust and corporate law, public utility and common carrier
regulation, and taxation.” 18 In its broader sense, the Law & Economics
Framework has been extended to non-market areas such as tort liability,
“the environment, legislative and administrative processes, constitutional
law, jurisprudence,. . .” etc. 19 However, given the diversity of
perspectives across nations, the current article does not make any
recommendation as to the proper scope of “law and economics” within
any particular country. But in the very least, the legal education in every
country should assure that their lawyers and legal system understand—
and are prepared to manage—the fundamental economic forces presented
by globalization.

15. DANIEL H. C OLE & P ETER Z. GROSSMAN, P RINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 44 (David
Anderson et al. eds. 2004).
16. C ALABRESI , supra note 17, at 2.
17. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. R EV. 1, 4 (1987).
18. Id. at 3.
19. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J.
499, 499–501 (1961); Posner, supra note 23, at 4.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE LAW & E CONOMICS FRAMEWORK

In 1780, Jeremy Bentham first published his Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation. 20 In that work, Bentham introduced
the concept of “utility” as “the principle that approves or disapproves of
every action according to the tendency it appears to have to increase or
lessen—i.e. promote or oppose—happiness of the person or group whose
interest is in question.” 21 Bentham sought to apply the concept of “utility”
in the context of government legislation. He recognized how utility could
be related to the structure of laws and behavior of individuals.
Although the intentional integration of economic concepts into legal
thought lay dormant after Bentham, the integration of economic principles
continued to quietly seep into legal issues and legal education. For
instance, in 1890, the U.S. government passed the Sherman Antitrust Act
that prohibited monopolistic behavior by companies. 22 This required
lawyers and judges to understand what a “monopoly” is and what
constituted monopolistic behavior. 23 Moreover, the spread of economics
into legal education also occurred outside the U.S. For instance, by the
1920’s, established elite, Italian law programs included courses in
economics, finance, and statistics. 24
Then, in 1937, Ronald Coase published The Nature of the Firm, in
which he observed that the traditional supply and demand curve in
economics was an incomplete explanation of how individuals make
decisions. 25 As explained by Coase, although the “economic system [of
supply and demand] ‘works itself[,]’ [t]his does not mean that there is no
planning by individuals. These exercise foresight and choose between
alternatives.” 26 In short, the desire to “economize” drives decisions not
only in supply and demand terms, but also as to whether or not market
mechanisms would be used at all. Where the cost of market mechanisms
is too high, individuals will look for market alternatives. Although
somewhat implicitly, Coase’s 1937 article also opened the possibility that
the content of legal rules might impact individual economic behavior. In
20. JEREMY B ENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE P RINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
(1823), reprinted in THE C OLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY B ENTHAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION i (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996).
21. Id. at 7.
22. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018).
23. Though at this point in time, it is unlikely that lawyers were required to fully understand
the economic consequences of monopolistic behavior.
24. Corrado Gini, The Contribution of Italy to Modern Statistical Methods, 89 J. R OYAL S TAT.
S OC’Y 703, 704 (1926).
25. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 387 (1937).
26. Id. at 387.
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other words, there might be a manageable relationship between law and
economics.
Surely, just as with Bentham, the full impact of Coase’s 1937 article
was not immediately apparent. Yet, economic principles continued to
merge with legal issues. By the 1950’s, the “importance of economics in
antitrust law [was] widespread.” 27 By the 1960’s, economic principles had
been applied to “antitrust law, . . . tax law, . . . corporate law, . . . patent
law, . . . and public utility and common carrier regulation.” 28 The time was
finally ripe for economic theory to more expressly integrate with legal
thought. This tipping point was reached in 1960 by Coase and 1961 by
Guido Calabresi.
Coase’s 1960 work in The Problem of Social Cost, highlighted the
critical relationship between legal rules and economic theory. 29 In his
1960 article (harking back to his 1937 article), Coase observed that all
legal systems have multiple potential approaches and all have transaction
costs:
All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose that
government regulation is called for simply because the problem is not
well handled by the market or the firm. Satisfactory views on policy can
only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms
and governments handle the problem of harmful effects. 30

In further clarifying this, Coase added:
Of course, if market transactions were costless [as assumed in classical
economics], all that matters (questions of equity apart) is that the rights
of the various parties should be well-defined and the results of legal
actions easy to forecast. But as we have seen, the situation is quite
different when market transactions are so costly as to make it difficult
to change the arrangement of rights established by the law. In such cases,
the courts [and governmental regulations and institutions] directly
influence economic activity. It would therefore seem desirable that the
courts should understand the economic consequences of their decisions
and should, insofar as this is possible without creating too much
uncertainty about the legal position itself, take these consequences into
account when making their decisions. 31

27. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. P A. L. R EV. 577, 577 (1953).
28. R ICHARD A. P OSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23 (6th ed. 2003).
29. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
30. Id. at 18; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
31. Coase, supra note 37, at 19; see also Williamson, supra note 36.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 5, Art. 1

834

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[54:827

In similar fashion, in 1961, Guido Calabresi used economic theory
to provide thoughtful insight into the proper scope of “risk distribution”
in tort law. 32 In doing so, Calabresi extensively utilized economic theory
to consider the proper scope of tort liability related to such things as
enterprise liability, 33 nuisance, 34 extra-hazardous activities, 35 and
independent contractors 36 —as well as the basis for exceptions to all of
these rules. 37
Taken together, Coase and Calabresi provided an informed
perspective where lawyers could obtain a greater understanding of law
and legal reasoning by resorting to relatively basic economic theory. The
Law & Economic Framework had arrived. 38
III.

A PRIMER ON LAW AND E CONOMICS

As an initial matter, it is necessary to emphasize that the Law &
Economics Framework is an approach to legal thought that simply
incorporates basic economic principles. Just as the use of basic math in
legal thought does not usually require the advice of a mathematician, the
incorporation of basic economic principles into legal thought usually does
not require the participation of an economist (though they are always
welcome to contribute). Indeed, by reserving the more advanced
economic questions for economists, scholars in both disciplines (law and
economics) can focus on more appropriate, higher-value, issues. So, what
are some of the basic economic theories that are relied upon by Law &
Economics? Consider one example.
If you look at a very simple sample plot of “Price versus Quantity”
for a fictitious good or service (see next page), the Demand Curve for that
good/service might look like the chart below. 39 This chart can be read to
32. Calabresi, supra note 25, at 499.
33. Id. at 500.
34. Id. at 534.
35. Id. at 541.
36. Id. at 545.
37. Id. at 547.
38. It should be noted that several other scholars deserve special mention as having further
contributed to either Law & Economics, or economic theory closely related to law. Richard A. Posner
was perhaps the greatest contributor to efforts in developing Law and Economics into a formal legal
theory. In contrast, Oliver Williamson continued to expand upon the foundation of Coase in
developing Transaction Cost Economics (within the field of economics).
39. Note, as shown for simplicity, the “curve” is a straight line with a negative slope of “1.” A
$US increase of 1 results in a decrease in quantity of 1. In reality, the demand curve is rarely a straight
line and the slope changes at different levels of price and quantity. See, e.g., Martin J. Bailey, The
Marshallian Demand Curve, 62 J. P OL. ECON. 255, 255–257 (1954); Paul R. Krugman, Pricing to
Market When the Exchange Rate Changes (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1926,
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state that at any given price (here, $US, but it could be any other currency
like €, £, ¥, ₫, ៛, ₭, ฿, or K), there will be a corresponding demand for a
specific quantity desired by the market. So, for instance, at a price of $US
4 (each), the hypothetical market demand will be 7 units. Though, if the
unit price increases—say to $US 6—the quantity desired by the market
will drop to a total of only 5 units. 40

41

Next, let’s consider the related role of the Supply Curve (on the next
page). For convenience, the original Demand Curve is still included
(dotted line) plus two different supply curves have been added. A Supply
Curve indicates how much—in price per unit—suppliers must receive in
order to produce a given quantity of goods. In the chart below, notice that
the grey Supply Curve intersects the Demand curve at the point marked
“A.” At this intersection, a price of $US 6 roughly corresponds to the
production of 5 units. Additionally, note that (according to the chart) the
quantity supplied drops to zero at a price of around about $US 5 per unit.
This might happen if, for instance, the cost of production for the suppliers

1986). It is respectfully submitted, that questions regarding the exact shape and slope of the demand
and supply curves are best left to determination by economists.
40. Note also, that if the unit price is $US 4 and quantity 7, then the total revenue will equal
$US 28. However, if the unit price is $US 6, the total revenue will be $US 30. As charted here, the
choices have different financial results.
41. This chart is adapted from P OSNER, supra note 36, at 4; see also HUBERT DOUGLAS
HENDERSON, S UPPLY AND DEMAND 22 (figure 1) (1922).
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is about $US 5. Below that point, suppliers would lose money. It would
not be worth it for suppliers to sell anything.
The point at which the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied
equal each other (again at the point marked “A”) is called the “equilibrium
price” or the “market-clearing price”—defined as that “price at which the
quantity of some good demanded precisely matches the quantity supplied,
leaving no unsatisfied demand and no residual supply.” 42 Why does this
matter? Because the failure to permit markets to achieve an efficient
equilibrium will ultimately cause individuals – either buyers, sellers, or
both - to alter the allocation of their resources. 43
For instance, consider what happens if—for example—the country
where the market is located has a corruption problem. Assume further that
the cost of that corruption is $US 2 per unit. Although the Demand Curve
will remain the same, the suppliers to that market will have to add the $US
2 per unit cost of corruption. The Supply Curve will now move up $US 2
and look like the black supply curve that intersects the Demand Curve at
the point marked “B.” At this intersection, consumers pay roughly $US 7
per unit and therefore the demand drops to a quantity of 4 units. In effect,
consumers pay more and suppliers produce less. Both the suppliers and
consumers lose. 44

42. DANIEL H. C OLE & P ETER Z. GROSSMAN, P RINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 8 (2005).
43. An important characteristic of market equilibrium is that, at that particular point, both
sellers and buyers value the good or service equally. Neither sellers or buyers possess any unmet,
excess, value—and therefore neither has any incentive to deploy their excess “utility” in other market
alternatives. When supply is above demand, buyers value the goods less than the sellers (and sellers
have an incentive to seek other alternatives). When supply is below demand, buyers value the goods
more than the sellers (and buyers have an incentive to seek other alternatives. See, e.g., JEFFREY L.
HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW & ECONOMICS 23 (2008).
44. The amount of total value lost by the market (both buyers and sellers) due to the corruption
would equal the area of the triangle ABC and is referred to as the “deadweight loss.” Id. at 25.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss5/1

10

Gaughan: Global Benefits

2021]

GLOBAL B ENEFITS

837

45

Notice further that at a consumer price of roughly $US 7, supplier
revenue would actually equal only $US 5 after paying the $US 2
corruption expense. This is would correspond to the exact point on the
original grey supply curve where suppliers would decide to abandon the
market altogether (marked as “C”). As drawn, corruption could essentially
create a situation where supply shortages would become a serious risk. 46
How would suppliers respond? We would expect that some firms
would respond to the diseconomies and pursue other alternatives. For
instance, some suppliers might try to avoid corruption expenses by
refusing to sell any individual units. Rather than selling units separately,
firms might only sell integrated products that use individual units.
Alternatively, some other firms might be tempted to illegally sell units on
an unofficial “black” market in a different effort to avoid the corruption
charges. And yet other firms might decide to abandon the local market
altogether and only sell their units in some other country. Of course, up to
this point, the discussion has been exclusively economic. However, the
Law & Economics Framework would further apply a unique perspective

45. This chart is adapted from Mark D. Hayford, Using Supply, Demand, and the Cournot
Model to Understand Corruption, 38 J. ECON. EDUC. 331, 333 (figure 1) (2007).
46. Realize that similar shortages could be caused by other sources as well. For instance, high
transaction costs or ill-informed price controls could have similar consequence.
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in analyzing the proper role of laws and institutions in helping to obtain a
more desirable outcome.
Undoubtedly, all countries have some type of moral consensus that
generally says “corruption is bad.” But how many countries have local
lawyers that economically understand why corruption is bad or how it
hurts the country? How many countries have lawyers that are equipped
to economically evaluate different laws on corruption, the implications of
black markets, the existence and form of corporate firms, and the overall
loss of global business? Given the critical role played by specific laws in
shaping the resulting behavior, is it really wise to leave the legal answers
to these questions only to economists?
The fundamental assumption of the Law & Economics Framework
(as in Economics alone) is that human beings are “rational utility
maximizer[s].” 47 For this reason, Law & Economics posits that all legal
rules are not created equally. Some legal rules can be adapted to achieve
better, more efficient, intended results—or otherwise avoid unintended
results. 48 For instance, in the example above, any legislation that would
further increase the transaction costs (without reducing any other costs)
for suppliers would essentially kill the local market. This could occur, for
instance, if local legislation proposed a $US 1 sales tax based on some
vague promise of policing of anti-corruption laws. If suppliers did not
believe that the tax would actually reduce the cost of corruption, the
legislation would likely deprive consumers of any goods on the free
market. Similarly, if there were separate legislation that sought to help
consumers by setting a maximum sales price of $US 6 per unit (without
removing corruption), it would also essentially cause suppliers to pursue
alternatives to legitimate market transactions.
Stated otherwise, the Law & Economics Framework has potential
application to areas well-beyond addressing corruption. Rather than
passively accepting that business firms exist to economize around less
efficient market mechanisms, 49 the law and economics perspective
enables lawyers and judges to ask which aspects of the existing legal
system are making the market mechanisms do bad things. Indeed, if the
local interests would prefer more firms to exist, the Law & Economics
Framework enables lawyers to ask how firms and markets can be made
even more economical.

47. P OSNER, supra note 36, at 4.
48. Coase, supra note 33.
49. Id. at 390.
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CRITICISMS OF THE LAW & E CONOMICS PERSPECTIVE

Unquestionably, a perspective informed by a linkage of law and
economics is not without its critics. Critics have claimed that law and
economics “lacks richness.” 50 Critics have pointed out that individuals are
not purely “rational maximizers of their self-interest.” 51 Other critics point
out that, as a legal theory, law and economics is non-falsifiable. 52 Other
critics assert that law and economics “inculcates amoral habits of
thought.” 53
In response, others have proposed a behavioral approach to law and
economics that addresses specific weaknesses like “bounded rationality,
bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.” 54 At the same time, other
critics have argued over whether law and economics is a positive legal
theory, normative legal theory, or something else. 55 Yet other critics assert
that the power of law and economics is overstated—that reality is a blend
of efficiency, plus accidental conditions akin to chaos theory, historical
remnants creating a path dependency, and evolutionary accidents. 56
All these criticisms certainly possess some merit. But most of these
criticisms fall well beyond the recommended purposes of the current
paper. The present paper identifies the inherent benefit of legal education
that provides a meaningful basis for understanding globalization. It is
completely unnecessary to determine whether Law & Economics
constitutes an independent legal theory. It is enough that economic theory
informs legal understanding and judgment. The insights to be gained for
lawyers in all nations clearly outweighs any detriment of some other
situations. To reject the law and economics perspective in addressing
issues related to globalization is to abandon an understanding of the forces

50. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique
of Classical Law and Economics, 65 C HI .-KENT L. R EV. 23, 23 (1989).
51. Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics and Law, 46 U. C HI . L. R EV. 281,
302 (1979).
52. Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
R EV. 451, 457 (1974).
53. Edmund W. Kitch, The Intellectual Foundations of “Law and Economics,” 33 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 184, 188 (1983).
54. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 S TAN. L. R EV. 1471, 1476 (1998); see also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
C ALIF. L. R EV. 1051, 1075–101 (2000).
55. Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics, 18
EUR. J. L. & ECON. 259 passim (2004).
56. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. R EV. 641 passim
(1996).
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creating both the challenges and the opportunities. It is also to minimize
the speed and ability of the local legal systems to adapt.
V.

CONCLUSION

The best way for globally-engaged countries to maximize the
benefits of globalization is to begin integrating the Law & Economics
Framework into their respective legal traditions. The best way to achieve
this is through legal education. In the process, legal education will be
facilitating a more informed national response to globalization. At the
same time, each country’s local bar will become a greater resource in
helping their clients and country to succeed.
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